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ABSTRACT 
 
The United States military is committed to the development of complete autonomy in unmanned 
vehicles, including armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The design and deployment of 
autonomous lethal UAS raises ethical issues that have implications for human factors.  System 
design, procedures, and training will be impacted by the advent of autonomous lethal UAS.  This 
paper will define relevant vocabulary, review the literature on robot ethics as it applies to the 
military setting, discuss various perspectives in the research community, address levels of UAS 
autonomy, and discuss implications for operator training, responsibility, and human-machine 
interaction.  Familiarity with these ethical issues and their repercussions will prepare human 
factors practitioners for the challenges created by this developing technology.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has 
increased dramatically in the past ten years (McMahan 
& Strawser, 2013), and is forecast to grow (Clapper, 
Young, Cartwright, & Grimes, 2007).  The military 
forces of the United States are committed to the 
development of complete autonomy in unmanned 
vehicles, including armed UAS (Sharkey, 2008).  
However, the development and deployment of 
autonomous lethal UAS raises questions about ethics 
that must be addressed.  How will these autonomous 
systems make moral choices?  What are the potential 
moral costs and benefits of autonomous lethal systems?  
If these systems are truly autonomous, who bears 
responsibility for their actions?  In addition, the 
operation of autonomous lethal UAS will lead to 
changes in the human-machine interface that have far 
reaching consequences for human factors.   
The primary purpose of this paper is to introduce 
human factors practitioners to the issues, arguments, and 
possibilities surrounding autonomous lethal UAS.  The 
secondary purpose is to suggest some of the changes in 
human-machine interaction that will develop as a result 
of the implementation of autonomous lethal UAS. 
 
REVIEW 
 
Definitions 
 
A discussion of the ethical considerations of 
autonomous lethal UAS must begin by establishing a 
common vocabulary.  Familiar terms, such as morality, 
ethics, autonomy, and responsibility need to be defined, 
as well as less familiar concepts such as the Laws of War 
and Just War theory.  
The terms “morality” and “ethics” are often used 
interchangeably, but a distinction is necessary in the 
context of autonomous machines.  Morality consists of 
behaviors and beliefs about what is right and wrong 
(Gros, Tessier, & Pichevin, 2012).  Ethics, on the other 
hand, can be defined as philosophical reflection on 
morality (Ethics, 2013).  Morality, therefore, is 
concerned with right behavior, while ethics is concerned 
with systems of thought about right behavior.   
Morality and ethics are only relevant when an agent 
possesses sufficient autonomy to make choices.  While 
there is no universally accepted definition in the 
literature, a useful view of autonomy in the context of 
robots is “the capacity to operate in the real-world 
environment without any form of external control for 
extended periods of time” (Lin, Bekey, & Abney, 2008, 
p. 103).  Inherent in this definition is the ability to make 
decisions independently from outside control.  However, 
autonomy is not a binary concept.  Rather, there are 
levels of autonomy for both humans and machines.  At 
the highest level, human autonomy includes the Kantian 
notion of autonomy of will.  That is, human beings have 
the capacity to think ethically, to reflect upon morality 
and formulate a system by which to make choices.  This 
autonomy of will is not particularly desirable in 
automated systems, since the main purpose of using 
robots is to have them meet the goals set by the human 
operator (Gros et al., 2012, p. 2).  Therefore, when we 
speak of autonomy in robots, we are talking about 
autonomy of means in how to accomplish a goal, not of 
end in choosing a goal.  Creating a robot capable of 
moral behavior is operationally desirable; creating a 
robot with human-like autonomy of will that is capable 
of thinking ethically is not. 
Although they share the same etymology, autonomy 
and automation must also be distinguished.  Automation 
is a “system that accomplishes a function that was 
previously carried out by a human operator” 
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).  
Automation, of itself, does not imply any ability to 
function independently or make decisions. 
Possessing, at a minimum, autonomy of means is a 
necessary precondition for being assigned moral 
responsibility.  In the context of lethal autonomous 
machines, moral responsibility is distinguished from 
causal responsibility.  Causal responsibility is ascribed 
when an agent causes an outcome, while moral 
responsibility is ascribed only when an agent makes a 
decision that causes an outcome.  For example, if a town 
is flooded because rain overwhelms the capacity of a 
dam, the rain has causal responsibility.  If, however, the 
town is flooded because shortcuts were taken in building 
the dam, the builder bears moral responsibility.  Clearly, 
the idea of moral responsibility is meaningless without 
the decision making power inherent in autonomy.   
The most salient aspect of moral responsibility for 
an autonomous lethal machine is related to conduct 
during battle.  Internationally accepted rules of behavior 
during wartime, known as Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) or Laws of War (LOW) are drawn from Just 
War theory.  Just War theory usually consists of two 
elements: jus ad bellum, the issues involved in going to 
war; and jus in bello, the issues involved in conducting 
war (Schulzke, 2011).  Even the most enthusiastic 
supporter of the role of autonomous lethal UAS would 
acknowledge that we are a long way from allowing a 
machine to decide when and why we wage war; 
therefore, discussion primarily involves jus in bello.  The 
two generally accepted components of jus in bello are 
proportionality and discrimination.  Proportionality 
requires that the use of force be at an appropriate level 
for the threat, while discrimination requires that force be 
applied only to the threat rather than to noncombatants.  
United States military forces are bound by law to abide 
by LOAC (Department of Defense, 2011). 
 
Approaches to Creating Moral Machines 
 
Three approaches are generally considered in the 
creation of moral reasoning in robots: top-down, bottom-
up, and hybrid (Allen, Smit, & Wallach, 2005).  The top-
down approach involves a rule-based, approach to 
programming moral reasoning.  Several rule-based 
approaches are part of the Western tradition, including 
consequentialist, in which the morality of an act is 
judged by its outcome, and Kantian, in which moral 
behavior consists of adhering to the Categorical 
Imperative that one should behave “only according to 
that maxim by which you can at the same time will that 
it be a universal law” (Gros et al., 2012).  In the military 
setting, the Laws of War provide a set of rules which 
could be used to govern moral reasoning.  Top-down 
approaches have the advantage of clarity and simplicity, 
but operationally, the main weakness is that no set of 
rules can anticipate every situation or accommodate 
every context.  In the real world, rules can often conflict, 
requiring prioritization and compromise beyond the 
capabilities of a rule based computational system.  On 
the battlefield, much is left to the judgment of the 
soldier.  
Some have suggested that instead, robots should 
learn morality the way children do, through learning and 
experience (Turing, 1950).  In this bottom-up approach, 
machine learning or artificial evolution would be used to 
inculcate moral reasoning in a UAS.  As in any 
instructional situation, appropriate behavior would be 
rewarded while undesirable behavior would be punished 
(Allen et al., 2005).  The bottom-up approach allows 
flexibility in complex situations.  However, one of the 
main concerns with this approach is that performance 
can never be guaranteed.  As any parent knows, even 
perfect training is not a guarantee of perfect behavior.  
Furthermore, if the machine makes a bad moral choice, 
there is no way to trace and correct the underlying cause 
(Gros et al., 2012).  Another objection to this approach 
to machine morality is that it does not account for the 
effect of natural law.  In the Western philosophical 
tradition, natural law refers to the presumption that 
human beings are born with some intrinsic morality.  
Clearly a bottom-up approach would need to account for 
the absence of natural law in machines. 
Hybrid approaches combine aspects of the top-down 
rule based approach with the bottom-up learning 
approach.  Of the many hybrid approaches, the most 
promising is based on virtue ethics (Lin et al., 2008).  
Instead of morality built on actions, virtue ethics 
considers morality built on character.  Actions are 
determined by their compatibility with a set of virtues, 
for example courage, compassion, or honesty.  The 
advantage is that virtues themselves constitute top-down 
guiding principles, while learning algorithms allow 
bottom-up approaches to learning specific actions that 
are compatible with the virtues (Lin et al., 2008).  A 
useful metaphor for the hybrid approach to developing 
moral beliefs and behavior can be found in grammar 
acquisition.  Children acquire a working knowledge of 
grammar from experience.  However, rules do exist that 
govern grammar usage.  Similarly, robots could learn 
moral beliefs and behavior from experience, but those 
same beliefs and behaviors would be learned by 
conforming to guiding principles.  However, combining 
these two opposing strategies involves harmonizing not 
only technical approaches, but underlying philosophies.   
 
 
Perspectives in the Research Community 
 
Divisions exist within the research community not 
only about how to engineer moral reasoning in robots, 
but also about the ethics of using autonomous lethal 
robots at all.  The arguments against autonomous lethal 
robots are presented largely in the context of Just War 
theory.  Prominent critics (Sharkey, 2008; Singer, 2009) 
argue that risk-free war encourages going to war, and 
increases the likelihood of violating of the precepts of 
jus ad bellum, the rules of going to war.  Another 
concern is that the jus in bello principles of 
proportionality and discrimination are impossible to 
operationalize.  No clear definition of “disproportionate 
suffering” or “civilian” can be created that would be 
airtight in combat situations.   
Advocates of autonomous lethal robots assert that 
machines do not need to be morally perfect in their 
actions, only better than their human counterparts.  
Human beings are subject to fatigue, anger, fear, 
vengefulness, and other qualities that have been 
implicated in wartime atrocities (Arkin, 2010).  Robotic 
systems, on the other hand, would be able to behave 
morally without the weaknesses unavoidable in human 
soldiers (Schulzke, 2011). 
Opponents also argue that a precondition of jus in 
bello is that moral responsibility can be assigned for all 
actions (Sparrow, 2007).  The very nature of autonomy 
means that the robot operates independently, meaning it 
would be unfair to hold the programmer or the operator 
responsible for the robot’s actions.  Supporters counter 
that responsibility can be assigned within the framework 
of product liability laws (Lucas, 2012).  If a faulty 
toaster burns your house down, the manufacturer is at 
fault: if a faulty robot kills an innocent, the manufacturer 
is held morally responsible.  These issues remain 
unresolved in the literature. 
 
Levels of Autonomy 
 
Complicating the issue of ethical use of autonomous 
lethal robots is the fact that autonomy itself has 
gradations.  The most accepted taxonomy of levels of 
machine autonomy is Sheridan’s range from 1, computer 
offers no assistance and human does it all, to 10, 
computer decides everything and acts autonomously 
(Parasuraman et al., 2000). 
Another way of approaching autonomy is to describe 
it according to human-machine interaction, in which the 
lowest level would be the direct control of teleoperation, 
and the highest level would be the dynamic autonomy of 
peer-to-peer collaboration (Goodrich & Schultz, 2007). 
Each military branch has its own slightly different 
taxonomy of automation, with some conflating 
autonomy and intelligence.  However, most researchers 
encourage separation of these two constructs, since 
complete autonomy is possible without intelligence, for 
instance in a jellyfish, and intelligence is possible 
without autonomy, for instance in a child (Clough, 
2002).   
Recently, taxonomies of autonomy have focused on 
a three-axis model consisting of the mission complexity 
the robot can handle, the environmental difficulty the 
robot can handle, and the independence from human 
interaction that the robot is capable of (Huang, Pavek, 
Novak, Albus, & Messin, 2005).  This three-axis model 
accounts for the obvious idea that a robot able to handle 
a complex mission in a challenging environment should 
be considered to have greater autonomy than a robot 
capable only of a simple mission under controlled 
circumstances, even if both robots have identical human 
interaction requirements.  For simplicity, this model will 
ultimately categorize robot autonomy on a scale of 1-10, 
in which the highest level consists of absolutely no 
required human interaction. 
 
NEW CONTRIBUTION 
 
Implications for Human Factors 
 
Although the highest levels of autonomy have not 
yet been achieved in aviation, some amount of 
perception, decision, and action autonomy have been 
incorporated in various subsystems, for example Traffic 
Collision Alerting Systems (TCAS).  In some cases, 
automation is linked with autonomy.  For example, the 
autopilot is physically controlling the aircraft while the 
flight management system determines the heading 
required for navigation. 
Parasuraman and Wickens (2008) have advocated 
adjusting levels of automation, and indirectly, autonomy, 
according to the stage of human information processing 
being supported.  They have cautioned against autonomy 
in decision making, particularly as it relates to lethality 
or human safety, until reliability can be assured.  As 
noted above, however, supporters of autonomous lethal 
UAS argue that reliability need not be perfect, only 
better than human reliability in the same situation 
(Arkin, 2010). 
Automation in aviation has created issues with 
system observability, mode confusion, and  automation 
surprise (Ferris et al., 2010); reduced situation awareness 
(SA), trust, reliability, overreliance, and complacency 
(Galster et al., 2007); and skill degradation 
(Parasuraman et al., 2000). 
 
 
Observability, mode confusion, automation surprise, 
and situation awareness. 
Low observability, coupled with high complexity 
and decision making authority, creates the potential for 
mode confusion and automation surprise, which are 
specific failures of situation awareness.  The bottom-up 
approach to engineering UAS morality would create low 
system observability, as the reasoning behind the UAS’ 
choices would not be known to the operators (Gros et al., 
2012).  Combined with the high complexity and decision 
making authority inherent in an autonomous UAS, this 
low system observability has the potential to degrade 
operator SA.  Top-down approaches, however, might 
alleviate this problem, since operators could become 
familiar with the fundamental moral architecture of the 
system.   
On the flight deck, systems that provide pilots with 
greater feedback beyond simply system behavior have 
been shown to improve mode awareness (Ferris, Sarter, 
& Wickens, 2010).  Thus, the design of human-UAS 
interface should include clear information about why the 
UAS is behaving in a certain way.  For example, a UAS 
should alert its operator if it is confronted with a moral 
choice, and inform the operator of its reasoning process. 
Trust, reliability, overreliance, and complacency. 
Operator trust in automation effects system 
performance (Ferris et al., 2010).  Understanding the 
rules that govern system behavior has been shown to 
increase operator trust (Galster et al., 2007).  At the same 
time, automation that functions properly but does not 
conform to the operator’s expectations has been shown 
to reduce trust (Lee & See, 2004).  Trust between 
humans develops in a different manner from trust 
between humans and machines (Lee & See, 2004).  The 
underpinnings of trust between humans and machines 
that have nearly human autonomy will be an interesting 
area of research. 
In addition to transparency, one of the variables 
affecting operator trust is reliability, both actual and 
perceived (Lee & See, 2004).  When malfunctions do 
occur, the UAS failure mode must be apparent.  Clearly, 
fault alert systems must go beyond warning lights and 
horns toward rich, contextual communication to help the 
operator understand the failure mode of the UAS. 
Excessive trust in automation, however, can lead to 
overreliance and complacency (Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997).  High workload appears to potentiate the effects 
of excessive trust, so that operators fail to monitor the 
automation as they should (Galster et al., 2007).  This 
may particularly become an issue as the ratio of 
operators to UAS decreases, and operator workload 
increases.   
As a result of overreliance, operators may fail to 
monitor inputs to the automation, reducing SA and 
making it difficult to take over should the automation 
fail (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  The lack of SA 
created by low system observability would exacerbate 
this problem.   
Skill degradation. 
Automation of manual tasks has been shown to lead 
to skill degradation (Parasuraman et al., 2000).  The 
same effect has been shown for decision making tasks 
(Galster et al., 2007).  One potential danger of UAS 
autonomy is that human operator decision making skills 
may be lost.  Reverting to lower levels of automation 
can successfully ameliorate skill loss, but this strategy 
may not be practical in fully autonomous UAS because 
of reduced SA due to low system observability, 
overreliance, and the distance inherent in the relationship 
between an operator and an autonomous agent.  In 
addition, reverting to a lower level of automation is only 
effective if the manual skill, in this case decision 
making, has been learned in the first place.  How can 
human supervisors acquire the skill of ethical decision 
making in battlefield situations if they are never meant 
to use them operationally? 
Training. 
Galster et al. (2007) suggest that the highest levels of 
machine autonomy may require types of operator 
training not required for the lower levels.  They suggest 
that we already have a model for the skills required for 
supervising fully autonomous UAS – that is, supervising 
human beings.  Some of the skills required include 
delegation and communication.  Both of these skills 
have been taught to military and commercial aircrews 
for decades in the form of Crew Resource Management 
(CRM).  Perhaps CRM training can be tailored to the 
unique demands of a system that includes humans, 
machines, and machines that behave as humans.   
 
Implications for human centered design 
 
Human centered design is based on the premise that 
if humans have final responsibility for a system, the 
“human operator should be at the heart of a system with 
full authority over all its functioning” (Parasuraman & 
Riley, 1997, p. 248).  But if the final responsibility for 
system safety does not rest with the human operator, is 
user-centered design still relevant?  What is the place of 
human factors engineering if the human being is no 
longer the heart of the system?   
Further, to some extent, automation shifts the locus 
of error from the operator to the designer (Parasuraman 
& Riley, 1997).  One task for those designing training 
and procedures will be to account for and mitigate these 
new error modes.   
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Research and development in unmanned military 
systems is driving toward full autonomy, even for lethal 
systems.  This raises ethical questions about the design 
and implementation of moral machines.  In particular, 
the advent of autonomous UAS will create issues in 
human-machine interface that go beyond what has been 
seen in flight deck and UAS automation to date.  Human 
factors practitioners must be involved in autonomous 
UAS design from the beginning.  Looking back at the 
issues raised by flight deck automation, and ahead to the 
issues unique to the relationship between operators and 
autonomous UAS will help prepare human factors 
practitioners to address the challenges raised by this 
developing technology.   
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